Suchergebnisse

'Data is the new oil' is a phrase that is frequently employed to indicate that digital technologies and data extraction have supplanted fossil fuels and geological extractivism as the central driver of the global economy. While this metaphor has been subject to discursive and ideological critique within media, communication and cultural studies, this article conducts a materialist analysis of the connections between data and oil. While claims that data is the new oil typically assume digital technologies to be clean, renewable and sustainable, an infrastructural approach reveals the vast quantities of oil and other fossil fuels necessary for digital capitalism, therefore repudiating claims that data can grow exponentially with no material costs. Consequently, the article explores how metabolic rifts and degrowth offer productive frameworks for outlining the contours of a sustainable and equitable digital future.

A comment on Robert Kagan's Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (2003) contends that his claim that American thinking is global/universal while the European viewpoint is particular/partial, is consistent with the Bush administration's ahistorical, ideological, nationalistic approach to foreign policy. It is contended that Kagan's Nietszchean view of power is both oversimplified & inaccurate. Historical evidence is presented to show the fallacy of his claim that weak countries are more apt to appeal to international law/morality than strong ones. Attention is called to Kagan's failure to address the historic shift from 19th-century Eurocentric balance of power politics to the American-led 20th-century movement toward international law that shatters his argument that the Bush administration's unilateralism is deeply rooted in American history & the inevitable result of America's geopolitical situation. Other examples of Kagan's ahistorical approach are pointed out to conclude that the policies he defends have made the world a far more dangerous place. J. Lindroth

This landmark book charts the rollercoaster history of both rich and poor, and the mechanisms that link them. Stewart Lansley examines the ideological rifts that have driven society back to the divisions of the past and asks why rich and poor citizens are still judged by very different standards.

EVALUATES THE POSSIBILITIES FOR BRINGING INTO EXISTENCE AN ALL-EUROPE, THAT IS, A EUROPE THAT IS NO LONGER DIVIDED INTO EAST AND WEST. CONCLUDES THAT AS LONG AS THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL RIFT CONTINUES TO EXIST AND CURRENT POWER ARRANGEMENTS ARE MAINTAINED THERE IS LITTLE HOPE FOR SUCH A RECONCILIATION. SEES LITTLE REASON TO HOPE FOR CHANGE IN STATUS QUO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

The sixth congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) met at Vijayawada, Andhra, from April 7 to April 16. Since it was the first such congress to be held since the beginning of the frontier disputes between India and China, it was clearly of some importance. The disputes have created bitter divisions within the party, and the ideological rift between the Soviet Union and China has intensified these divisons. For nearly two years the CPI has been unable to function effectively and the rift within it is openly acknowledged by members.

The Sino-Soviet rift in the 1950s caused the two countries to take divergent paths in their advocacy of an international communist movement. China's ideological support of anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle was especially well received in Iran, and Maoist organizations there quickly set out to propagate China's revolutionary politics in the region, at the same time diluting that of pro-Soviet organizations. China's alliance with Iran as a counter to Soviet expansion, particularly as it was enhanced by China's improved relations with the United States, gradually took precedence over its ideological support of revolutionary movements in Iran. China's post-Mao policy of expansion of political influence in Iran received its impetus from the U.S.-Soviet support of Iran during the Iran- Iraq conflict. In order to assert its influence in the region China began to strengthen its political and trade relations with Iran as well as with Iran's adversary, Iraq. Directions taken by the present Chinese leadership continue to deemphasize ideological support of revolutionary struggle in favor of more capitalist-oriented policies.

China and Russia have had a difficult relationship for three centuries. Russia's objective is to attain a commun ized China subservient to her. Chinese Communists were di rected by her to incorporate themselves into the Chinese Na tionalist movement in the 1920's, and the first coalition be tween them failed. Following Japan's aggression against China in the 1930's, the Communists joined the National Government again. When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek rejected Stalin's demands, the latter aided the Communists to seize the main land and gave them substantial assistance afterwards. The rift between Peiping and Moscow began in 1958 when Khrushchev adopted a "peaceful coexistence" policy vis-à-vis the West and also denied support to Mao for the latter's economic and mili tary adventures. Relations continue to deteriorate following the termination of Soviet aid. The fundamental cause of the split is ideological. Other issues are the struggle for leadership, territorial claims against Russia, and Peiping's dissatisfaction with Moscow's partiality towards neutralist countries. The implications of the rift are (1) the absence of Soviet influence on the mainland; (2) the ultimate downfall of the Peiping regime; (3) no likelihood of reconciliation between Moscow and Peiping; (4) Russia should welcome the Chinese people's efforts to restore their freedom; and (5) the United States should encourage the Chinese people to hasten the passing of the Peiping regime.

ObjectivesCompeting theoretical models from economics and social psychology would suggest either a negative or positive association between income inequality and attitude polarization. In order to address the conflicting nature of the predictions made by these theoretical accounts, this analysis tests whether inequality indeed impacts polarization in Left‐Right ideological self‐placement for a diverse sample of democracies.MethodsI use World Values Surveys—European Values Surveys 1981–2008 combined data for obtaining a large time‐series cross‐sectional data set of indicators of attitude polarization. I rely on mixed‐effects models to test whether there is any connection between income inequality and polarization, after controlling for additional relevant factors, such as educational inequality.ResultsFindings point to no effect of income inequality on any measure of attitude polarization once educational inequality is controlled for. The latter type of inequality, on the other hand, has a consistent effect on two indicators of inequality, spread and bimodality, in the expected direction.ConclusionsIn spite of a highly plausible posited connection between income inequality and Left‐Right attitude polarization, this analysis has failed to find any connection between the two. Instead, educational inequality appears to exert a consistent effect on attitude polarization. The findings point to the need for a more nuanced view of connections between economic inequality and political attitudes and behaviors, and to the possibility that shifts in inequality of the magnitude observed in OECD countries might not lead to social tensions.

Abstract
This study analyzes the link between egalitarian ideals and the rise in party polarization in Congress. To demonstrate how philosophical differences over conceptions of fairness, equality, and justice help explain the recent growth in partisanship over the past few decades, I argue one overlooked explanatory factor which assists in capturing this ideological rift is noncontributory welfare spending. Recovering annual ideal point estimates between 1947 and 2018 that are comparable with annual federal spending, I use multivariate time series models and find convincing evidence which suggests welfare outlays have a strong short- and long-run effect on polarization. Moreover, analysis of the roll call record also shows when ideal point estimates are recovered by specific policy area, lawmakers exhibit higher levels of ideological separation on welfare compared to, among others, policies such as defense and transportation. Robustness checks confirm these findings also hold even when controlling for income inequality.